Indiana Law Journal
Volume 1

Issue 4

Article 3

4-1926

Effect Upon Negotiability of Provisions for Acceleration or
Extension of Time in Bills and Notes
C. Severin Buschmann
Indianapolis Bar Association

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buschmann, C. Severin (1926) "Effect Upon Negotiability of Provisions for Acceleration or Extension of
Time in Bills and Notes," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol1/iss4/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access
by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

COMMENTS
EFFECT UPON NEGOTIABILITY OF PROVISIONS FOR
ACCELERATION OR EXTENSION OF TIME IN
BILLS AND NOTES
The decisions are in considerable disagreement as to the effect upon
negotiability of a provision for acceleration of an instrument otherwise negotiable. The courts seem to make a distinction between a
provision for acceleration which places upon the maker the conditional
duty to pay at an earlier date, and one which gives a power to the
payee or holder to declare the instrument due.
The majority of the decisions, both prior to and since the adoption
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, hold that a provision placing upon
a maker the conditional duty of paying at an earlier day than the day
fixed does not render the instrument non-negotiable. For example,
the decisions are fairly consistent in holding that a provision rendering the note due by reason of some default upon the part of the maker
does not impair negotiability. Nor is this affected by the fact that
the provision might provide that the holder shall have the power to
declare the instrument due in case of such default. The theory of
these cases is that the maker has fixed a day certain upon which he
is under a legal duty to make payment, but that he is also under a
conditional duty to pay at an earlier date in case of a failure upon
his part to comply with certain conditions.'
In the case of Nickell v. Bradslhw, there was a provision in the
instrument for the acceleration of the due date upon the happening
of special events solely within the control of the maker at the option
of the holder. In holding the instrument negotiable, the court said,
in quoting from another decision :2
" 'To constitute a negotiable promissory note, the time, or the event,
for its ultimate payment, must be fixed and certain; yet it may be
made subject to contingencies, upon the happenings of which, prior
to the time of its absolute payment, it shall become due. The contingency depends upon some act done or omitted to be done by the
maker, or upon the occurrence of some event indicated in the note;
and not upon any act of the payee or holder, whereby the note may
become due at an earlier date.'
"We think the general rule should be, and the same is, hereby
adopted in this state; and, applying it to the paper here in question,
we hold that the same is negotiable. None of the conditions in the acceleration clause depend upon the act of the holder, nor are they within his control; but all of such contingencies depend either upon some
act or omission of the maker, or upon an event indicated in the paper,
not within the control of either party." 3
I

McCormick & Co. v. Gem State Oil and Products Co. (Idaho) 222 Pac.

286, 34 A. L. R. 876, 872; Nickell u. Bradshaw (Ore.) 183 Pac. 12, 11 A.
L.2R. 623; 3 R. C. L. 910, 8 C. J. L39.
Nickell v. Bradshaw 183 Pac. 12 a p. 18.
3 Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa. 13, 15 Amer. Rep. 542.
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The court thus reiterates the rule frequently stated to the effect that
an acceleration provision in favor of the holder in case he deems himself insecure renders the instrument non-negotiable. The only explanation seems to be an idea that acceleration clauses entirely under the
control of the holder and completely dependent upon his whim or
4
caprice, independent of any act of the maker, are to be condemned.
It is difficult to see why a note containing a conditional promise by
the maker to pay at an earlier date upon the commission or omission
of some act by him, at the option of the holder, should be negotiable,
end a note giving the holder the power to declare the note due whenever he deems himself insecure should be held non-negotiable. In
both situations there is a fixed or determinable time of payment.
In the first situation the maker is under a conditional duty to pay at
an earlier date, and the holder has a conditional right to demand payment at such earlier date upon exercise of the power (option) given
him. In the second situation, the holder has a power to demand payment at such earlier date, and the maker is under a correlative liability that the holder will exercise the power.
Moreover, instruments have been held negotiable which give the
maker the power or privilege of payment at an earlier date; for instance, "on or before a certain date." 5
There seems to be no sufficient difference in the existing legal relations in the two situations to reach opposite results upon the question
of negotiability. To decide that a note is or is not negotiable, depending upon whether it is accelerated by the act of the maker or
holder, can find no support in the negotiable instruments law. It
seems to be more nearly an effort upon the part of the courts to curtail the powers of a holder of commercial paper upon some vague
ground of public policy rather than the result of reasoning and interpretation. Of course, the provisions in some instruments require
the performance of something other than the payment of money, and
are therefore non-negotiable. This was the holding in the case of
Holladay State Bank v. Hoffmai where the note provided that additional security should be furnished by the maker in case of depreciation of collateral. In the absence of such a reason there seems little
basis for the general distinction heretofore pointed out.
Courts are likewise in conflict as to the effect upon negotiability of
a provision for extension. In a recent case a note payable to the
maker and indorsed by him in blank contained the provision: "The
makers and indorsers . . . agree that this note may be extended
in whole or in part without their consent." Held, the note was not
rendered non-negotiable by this provision. 7 Sections 1 and 184 of the
'Nickell v. Bradshaw, 183 Pac. 12.
8 C. J.138.
8 (Kas.) 116 Pac. 239, 35 L. R. A. N. S.
7McCoarmick & Co. Bankers v. Nielson (Utah 1925) 233 Pac. 122.
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N. I. L. provide that a negotiable instrument "must be payable on
demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time."
A provision similar to the one set out in the case reported above is
often inserted to avoid any contention upon the part of sureties that
they are released by a binding agreement of the holder to extend the
time of payment. The word "maker" is used to prevent misunderstanding or failure to distinguish between makers, indorsers, sureties, etc.
Logically, the fact that the holder enters into a binding agreement
to extend the time should not affect negotiability. Of course, a provision for extension after maturity cannot affect negotiability, because
at maturity the instrument ceases to be negotiable by operation of law.The Utah case reported above is in accord with the majority rule in
that respect. The provision for the extension in such ease prevents
the operation of the rule of suretyship which otherwise would release
the sureties thereon. Some courts, however, adopt a literal construction of the clause, and hold the note non-negotiable on the theory that
the provision permits the holder or any one of the parties authorized
to extend the time without the other's consent, thus rendering the time
of payment not fixed or determinable. This is the established rule
in Indiana, the decisions both before and after the adoption of the
N. I. L. reaching that result.9
In some of the cases there is a provision that "the payee, or his assigns, may extend the time of payment thereof from time to time
indefinitely." In such a case if the payee and maker were the same
person, the maker would have the power to extend his own note indefinitely. Therefore such a note was held clearly non-negotiable.10
But the same rule has been followed in Indiana without regard to
whether or not the payee and maker were the same person.1
As has been pointed out, one would suppose the purpose in inserting such a provision was to prevent discharge of sureties in case the
holder enters into a binding agreement to extend time and courts
should so construe it. But regardless of the rule elsewhere, the rule
is settled in Indiana., and possibly Iowa and Michigan courts, that such
1 2
a provision renders the note non-negotiable.
The tendency of the recent decisions is toward that construction
which will sustain negotiability. Such an interpretation is reasonable
and desirable from a business and commercial standpoint.
C. SEVERIN BUSCHMANN.

Of the Indianapolis Bar.
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Navajo County Bank v. Dolson 163 Cal. 485, 41 L. R. A. N. S. 787.
9 Wayne County Natl. Bank v. Cook 73 Ind. App. 404; Merchants' and
Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Fraze 9 Ind. App. 161; Evans v. Odem 30 Ind.

App. 207; Oyler v. McMurry 7 Ind. App. 645.

10 Woodbury v. Roberts 59 Iowa 348.
11 Glidden v. Henry 104 Ind. 278. Rosenthal v. Rambo 28 Ind. App. 265.
12

For a general discussion see 8 C. J. 140; 24 Mich. L. Rev. 64 L. R. A.

1916 D. 1280 (note).

